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NOTE
DEDUCTIBIITY OF EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTONS
TO EMPLOYEE-BENEFIT PLANS
Since 1921 employers have been allowed immediate deductions
from gross income for contributions to qualified pension and profit-
sharing trusts, while the employee-beneficiaries have not been taxed
until distribution of the funds contributed.- Especially during years
of high corporate taxation this permits the employer to shift much
of the burden of funding employee-benefit plans to the federal gov-
ernment. Further, the employee pays no income tax on his interest
in the contributions made for his benefit until the decrease in in-
come normally accompanying retirement has placed him in a lower
tax bracket. Until 1942 an employee-benefit plan was entitled to
these tax advantages if it was "for the exclusive benefit of some or
all of [the] employees, 2" and deductible contributions were limited
in amount only by the requirement that when added to the regular
salary of the beneficiary, the total could not exceed reasonable
1. 4 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation § 25.69 (1942).
Since 1918 regulations have recognized that pensions were deductible as ordi-
nary and necessary expenses. Ibid.
2. E.g., Revenue Act of 1938, § 165 (a), 52 Stat. 518 (1938).
compensation for the services rendered.3 As the burdens of cor-
porate and individual income taxes became more onerous, the
prospect of deferring payments of compensation by use of employee-
benefit plans became more attractive, especially to the highly paid
who were finding increasing difficulty in saving enough to maintain
their standard of living after retirement.4 Thus arose the practice
of establishing generous tax exempt employee-benefit programs,
the benefits of which were limited to the executive level personnel
-often including those with heavy stock holdings in the employer
corporation.5
To correct these abuses the Revenue Act of 1942 required that,
to be exempt, employee-benefit plans must satisfy elaborate pro-
visions the purpose of which is to prevent discrimination in eligi-
bility requirements or benefits in favor of "officers, shareholdeks,
persons whose principal duties consist in supervising the work of
other employees, or highly compensated employees."'7 At present,
to receive the above described favorable tax treatment, a benefit
plan must satisfy the anti-discrimination provisions of Internal
Revenue Code Section 165 (a), and the contributions must be within
the maximums permitted by Section 23(p) and must qualify as
ordinary and necessary expenses within the terms of Section 23 (a) .$
The difficulty of measuring an employee-benefit plan by the stand-
ards prescribed by the statute, coupled with the necessity that the
employer be sure of the tax status of the plan before he commits
himself under it evidently has led to a provision for advance ap-
proval of proposed plans by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.9
3. See Freyburger, Pension Plans-the Philosophy of Section 165(a),
22 Taxes 60 (1944).
4. See Lourie and Cutler, Income Tax Advantages of Deferred Com-
pensation under Qualified and Unqualified Plans, 9 Fed. B. J. 153, 157 (1948).
5. See e.g., Phillips H. Lord, 1 T. C. 286 (1942) (2 / of the employer
contributions were for the benefit of the sole shareholder of the employer) ;
The Princess Garmet Co., P-H 1942 TC Mee. Dec. f1 42,639 (1942) (of
the taxpayer's 300 employees, the eight benefited were all shareholders or
executives) ; Raymond J. 'oore, 45 B. T. A. 1073 (1941) (plan was for
the benefit of 10 selected employees, all of whom were shareholders) ; 4
Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation § 25.71 (Supp. 1952).
6. 56 Stat. 862 (1942).
7. Int. Rev. Code § 165(a).
8. Section 23(p) permits deductions only for contributions which con-
stitute ordinary and necessary expenses as defined in Section 23 (a) and
which are made to benefit plans exempt under Section 165 (a). Thus, although
the latter section refers only to exemption of the income of the employees'
trust, its requirements also control the right of the employer to deductions
for his contributions to the trust.
9. See H. S. D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F. 2d 831, 846 (6th Cir. 1951);
Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co. v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 650, 651 (E.D.




Without attempting to catalog the myriad technical rulings of nar-
row application that have been made in this area, this Note will
examine the general principles bearing on an employer's right to
deductions for his contributions to an employee-benefit 0 plan.
REQUIRED ScOPE OF COVERAGE
The abuses that would have been permitted by a literal inter-
pretation of the provisions that an exempt benefit plan need include
only "some" of the taxpayer's employees 1 led th courts, at least
when faced with flagrant cases, to deny deductions for contributions;
the reasoning was that the unexpressed intent of Congress had
been to permit tax advantages only to plans designed to provide for
the security of a large percentage of the employees.1 2 In 1942, Code
Section 165 (a) was amended13 to express this intent by requiring
that a qualified plan benefit at least either (1) seventy per cent
of the taxpayer's employees, or (2) eighty per cent of the class
eligible to benefit, from which class not more than thirty per cent
of all employees may be excluded, or (3) a classification which in
the judgment of the Commissioner does not discriminate in favor
of officers, shareholders, supervisory employees, or the highly paid.
The last alternative was included to permit exclusion of large classes
of employees, such as those whose total wages are subject to social
security taxes and whose position is such that there is good reason
for denying them the benefits of the plan. 4
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
Prior to 1942, though the Internal Revenue Code did not express-
ly prohibit employee-benefit plans from discriminating in favor of
shareholders-employees, if an excessive proportion of the em-
ployer's contributions accrued to the benefit of a shareholder, a
10. "Employee-benefit" plan will be used as a generic term inclusive
of pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus and annuity plans, since many of the
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code apply to all of these types of plans.
11. E.g., Revenue Act of 1938, § 165(a), 52 Stat. 518 (1938).
12. E.g., Hubbell v. CIR, 150 F. 2d 516 (6th Cir. 1945) (alternative
holding) (of 350 employees, the two benefited by the plan were substantial
shareholders) ; Harold G. Perkins, 8 T. C. 1051 (1947) (short-lived planfor benefit of four key employees out of 41,000) ; W. F. Parker, 38 B. T. A.
989 (1938) (81% of contributions were for benefit of majority shareholder
or taxpayer). In view of the fact that Congress had rejected suggestions that
a minimum scope of coverage be prescribed, see Hubbell v. CIR, supra at
522 and authorities cited, these interpretations of the Congressional intent
behind the "some" phrase seem questionable.
13. Revenue Act of 1942, § 162, 56 Stat. 862 (1942).
14. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-3 (1943) ; Sen. Rep. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1942).
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plan was denied tax advantages on the ground that it did not
satisfy the requirement that it be for the exclusive benefit of the
taxpayer's employees.15 The only other limitation was the require-
ment that the payments must not constitute disguised dividends ;16
the bona fides of such pension payments depended on whether the
total benefits to the employee were within the limits of reasonable
compensation for the services rendered and on the extent to which
the distributions were influenced by proportions of stockholdings
of the recipients.'
7
The 1942 Revenue Act amended Code Section 165(a) to ex-
pressly provide that employee-benefit plans must not discriminate
in favor of shareholders through eligibility requirements or varia-
tions in benefits.' Since it is clear that shareholder-employees may
still participate in benefit plans, the problem is the extent to which
they may benefit before fatal discrimination will be found. To clarify
this problem the Treasury Department announced that a plan
would generally not be considered discriminatory if not more than
thirty per cent of the employer contributions were for the benefit
of employees each of whom held ten per cent or more of the stock
of the employer.' Subsequently, however, the Tax Court per-
mitted a plan to qualify under Section 165 (a) although more than
fifty per cent of the contributions were for the benefit of the only
two stockholders of the employer.2 0 The court reasoned that the
large contributions were legitimate results of the high salaries and
advanced age of these employees and did not reflect discrimination
based on shareholdings. The Commissioner's acquiescence in this
ruling led to the abandonment of the "thirty per cent rule."2'
15. W. F. Parker, 38 B. T. A. 989 (1938) (alternative holding).
16. Astorian-Budget Publishing Co., 44 B. T. A. 969 (1941).
17. See Forcum-James Co., 7 T. C. 1195 (1946) ; Gisholt Machine Co.,
4 T. C. 699 (1945) ; Princess Garmet Co., P-H 1942 TC Mem. Dec. ff 42,639(1942) ; Raymond J. Moore, 45 B. T. A. 1073 (1941).
18. Int. Rev. Code § 165(a) (3) and (4); U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §
29.165-1 (1944).
19. I. T. 3674, 1944 Cum. Bull. 315; I. T. 3675, 1944 Cum. Bull. 316;
I. T 3676, 1944 Cum. Bull. 317. The "thirty per cent rule" would have arbi-
trarily limited shareholder-employees' benefits even though no difference in
treatment based on the fact of shareholdings existed. Such limitation depends
on the premise that provision for retirement income for shareholders need
not be encouraged since their security will be assured by dividend payments.
See XV. F. Parker, 38 B. T. A. 989, 996-997 (1938), but this premise is valid only
if the corporate income is derived largely from invested capital rather than
the personal services rendered by the shareholder-employees. The "thirty
per cent rule" unduly penalizes a corporation owned by a small group of
shareholders. See 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1071 (1950). If the stock is more widely
distributed, few employees are likely to hold the proscribed ten per cent.
20. Volckening Inc., 13 T. C. 723 (1949).
21. I. T. 4020, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 61.
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The reasoning of the Tax Court in refusing to follow the thirty
per cent rule could ultimately permit shareholder-employees to re-
ceive any amount of benefits required by a benefit formula that
applies uniformly to all employees. However, in light of the limits
of "reasonable compensation" for services rendered, 22 there appears
to be little danger that any extension of this reasoning would result
in excessive benefit payments to shareholders.23
At present, benefits under an employee benefit plan may vary
in proportion to the total compensation paid to the employee,2 4 and
disqualification based on discrimination in favor of the highly paid
will result only if the ratio of benefits to total compensation is
greater for any group of employees than for another less highly
paid group.25 Increased benefits may be awarded employees for
length of service, provided the result does not discriminate in favor
of the highly paid.2 8 However, since long periods of service often
lead to pay increases, the group benefiting from the use of years-of-
service factor will usually contain a disproportionate number of the
highly paid. Thus, the effect of such a factor could well be a dis-
tortion of the benefits-compensation ratio in favor of the highly paid.
In fact, with the passage of time a qualified plan could well be dis-
qualified if many of the employees covered remained to take ad-
vantage of the years-of-service factor while their total compensation
was increasing. To avoid this anomaly it would seem better to re-
define "discrimination" in this area so that it would not exist if all
employees having equal periods of service receive plan benefits con-
stituting equal proportions of their total compensation.
In determining the existence of discrimination in favor of the
highly paid, benefits to which an employee will be entitled under
government retirement programs and under the private plan are to
be considered together to arrive at the ratio between benefits and
total compensation for any wage group.2 7 A comparison will be made
22. See note 86 infra and text thereto.
23. See 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1071 (1950).
24. Int. Rev. Code § 165(a)(5); U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-4(1944); Betty C. Stockvis, P.H 1951 TC Mem. Dec. 1 51,023 (1951);
Volckening Inc., 13 T. C. 723 (1949).
25. I. T. 3678, 1944 Cum. Bull. 321; P. S. 28, P-H Pension & Profit-
Sharing Serv. U 9526 (1944). For administrative convenience, changes in
compensation may be disregarded until great enough to produce a certain
minimum effect on benefits, even though such a policy would be less likely
to work to the disadvantage of the highly paid. Mim. 5677, 1944 Cum. Bull.
320.
26. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-4 (1944); I. T. 3685, 1944 Cum.
Bull. 324 (no discrimination) ; I. T. 3686, 1944 Cum. Bull. 326 (discrimination
found) ; P. S. 28, supra note 25 (discrimination found).
27. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-3 (1943)."
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not only between the amounts of periodic pension payments, but
also between the values of the total anticipated payments-periodic
payments multiplied by the years of life expectancy of the em-
ployees. This comparison would reveal discrimination if a private
plan entailed pension payments of greater total value arising from
a longer period of retirement permitted by a minimum retire-
ment age lower than that of the related government program.2 8
WXrages covered by federal or state retirement insurance programs
may be excluded from the benefit formula of a properly integrated
private plan, or benefits based on such wages may be calculated at
a reduced rate.2-3 To expedite integration between the federal social
security program and private benefit plans, the Treasury Depart-
ment has prescribed the maximum benefits that will be offset by
social security payments to those excluded from plans having
various minimum wage requirements.3"
When an employee leaves his employer before he has worked
for the minimum period required by the plan to entitle him to re-
ceive any of the contributions made for his benefit, forfeitures
results. The funds forfeited similarly are subject to the limitation
that they must not be used so as to discriminate in favor of officers,
shareholders, supervisors, or highly paid employees. 31 Such funds
may apparently be used to reduce the required employer contribu-
tions.3 -'
The discrimination problem also may arise when an employee-
benefit plan is terminated soon after its inception. At the institution
of any plan some of the employees covered will be within a few
years of the retirement age, and this group is likely to include a
large number of officers, supervisors, and highly paid employees.
In order to effectively solve the problem of superannuation, these
employees should be permitted to retire with full benefits at the
normal retirement age. 33 To provide these benefits large contribu-
tions will be required for these emplyees during the relatively
short period they will remain employed. Should the plan be aban-
doned after a short period of operation, the employees whose bene-
fits has been rapidly funded would receive much larger benefits in
28. I. T. 3615, 1943 Cum. Bull. 477.
29. Int. Rev. Code § 165(a) (5) ; U. S. Treas. 111, § 29.165-4 (1944).
30. 'Mim. 6641, 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 41.
31. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-4 (1944); P. S. 22, P-H Pension
& Profit-Sharing Serv. I 9520 (1944).
32. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1 (1944).
33. See Goldstein, How to Amend Existing Pension and Deferred Dis-
tribution Profit-Sharing Plans to Meet Your Current Conditions, 7th Annual
Inst. on Fed. Taxation 1253, 1258 (N.Y.U. 1949).
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relation to their total compensation than those whose benefits
would have been funded over a long period of employment.34
To aid in the solution of this problem the Treasury Department
has prescribed certain limits for employer contributions that it
will find "generally acceptable" to preclude the possibility of dis-
crimination on termination, if at all times the full current costs35
of the plan have been met. 36 These limits apply to the contributions
of funds that would be received by any employee in the event of
his withdrawal from the plan or its termination during the first
ten years of its operation, if he is among the twenty-five highest
paid whose anticipated annual benefits exceed fifteen hundred dol-
lars. The contributions limits increase in proportion to the em-
ployee's total compensation and the number of years the plan has
been in operation. 37 Subsequent rulings, however, have pointed out
that compliance with these limits seldom precludes discrimination
but merely limits it in some cases so that such compliance will be
a guarantee against disqualification only to the extent it actually
prevents discrimination 8 as judged by the usual standards. 30 Since
plan amendments made at the time of termination which eliminate
any resulting discrimination will apparently prevent retroactive
disqualification, 40 the value of complying with the limits set out by
the Department seems restricted solely to the fact that it will inform
the affected employees that they will not receive full benefits in the
event of early termination of the plan.
BONA FIDE INTENTION TO BENEFIT EMPLOYEES
Even though no discrimination results, early termination of a
plan for any reason other than "business necessity" will constitute
at least evidence that it was not intended as a bona fide plan for the
34. See Mim. 6163, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 58.
35. "Full current cost," which means "normal cost," Mim. 5717, 1944
Cum. Bull. 321, is the amount of employer contributions that would be re-
quired as a result of each year's operation of the plan had it been in effect
since the beginning of service of each covered employee and had all actuarial
assumptions concerning mortality, withdrawals, etc., been fulfilled. U. S.
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(p)-7 (1948).
36. Mim. 5717, supra note 35.
37. Ibid. These limits do not prevent the payment of full benefits to
presently retired employees, but make the continuation of such payments
contingent on the continuation of the plan. P. S. 25, P-H Pension & Profit-
Sharing Serv. ff 9523 (1944).
38. P. S. 52, P.H. Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. f 9551 (1945) ; cf.
P. S. 42, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. ff 9540 (1944).
39. See note 25 supra and text thereto.
40. Mim. 6136, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 58.
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exclusive benefit of the employees, 41 as is required. 42 A qualifying
profit-sharing or stock bonus plan must not only be intended as
permanent, but the amounts of employer contributions must be
controlled by a formula incorporated in the plan rather than by
the discretion of the employer.43 The Treasury Department has
stated44 that it will regard any departure from the contributions
formula of a profit-sharing plan as a partial termination. A suspen-
sion of contributions to a pension plan will be so regarded only if
past service costs45 rise above the level at which they stood when
the plan was instituted.40 These rulings as to termination and con-
trol of contributions reflect the reluctance of the Treasury Depart-
ment to permit an employer to channel funds into a tax exempt
benefit plan during periods of high profits, only to abandon the
plan or reduce contributions to it when lower profits make the tax
advantages less attractive.4 7
"Business necessity" as an acceptable reason for the termina-
tion or modification of a benefit plan generally consists of such cir-
cumstances as unforeseeable business conditions4" that preclude
the expenditures to support the plan. 9 A bona fide sale 0 of the
business of the employer to a buyer that has its own benefit plan
or, being without one, does not wish to extend a plan to all its em-
41. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1 (1944); P. S. 7, P-H Pension &
Profit-Sharing Serv. 1 9505 (1944). This situation has also been said to
raise a presumption of mala fides. P. S. 52, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing
Serv. ff 8551 (1945). Should capricious termination be accompanied by dis-
criminatory operation of the plan, the strength of the evidence of mala fides in-
creases. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1 (1944). Such evidence of mala fides
was refuted by a showing that the purpose of the plan of serving in lieu
of a wage increase had been frustrated by an adverse ruling of the Salary
Stabilization Unit. Blume Knitwear, Inc., 9 T. C. 1179 (1947).
42. Int. Rev. Code § 165(a).
43. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1 (1944).
44. P. S. 57, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. ff 9556 (1946).
45. Past service, or supplementary, cost is the amount required at any
time to provide the benefits guaranteed by the plan that will not be funded
by payments of normal costs; i.e., those arising as a result of employment
prior to the adoption of the plan. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(p) -7 (1948).
46. P. S. 57, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. 1 9556 (1946). Cur-
tailment of benefits also must be justified by "business necessity." Mim. 6136,
1947-1 Cum. Bull. 58.
47. See E. R. Vagner Alfg. Co., 18 T. C. No. 76 (June 25, 1952) ; P. S.
7, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. ff 9505 (1944).
48. P. S. 52, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. ff 9551 (1945) (fore-
seeable drop in post-war profits not acceptable).
49. E. R. Wagner Affg. Co., 18 T. C. No. 76 (June 25, 1952) (modifica-
tion because of adverse business conditions) ; P. S. 7, P-H Pension & Profit-
Sharing Serv. ff 9505 (1944) (insolvency, bankruptcy or adverse condi-
tions) ; 'Mim. 6136, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 58 (employees' demand for wage in-
crease about equal to cost of plan).
50. P. S. 52, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. 1 9551 (1945) (trans-
fer to former stockholders as partners not bona fide).
19531
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ployees justifies termination of the plan without reference to "busi-
ness necessity." 51 Changes of circumstances that render a plan
less advantageous to management are generally not acceptable. 2
A Treasury Regulation has defined a profit-sharing "plan"
within the terms of Section 165 (a) as a program "based on a defi-
nite predetermined formula for determining the profits to be shared
and a definite predetermined formula for distributing the funds
accumulated under the plan. . . ."r A series of rulings clearly inter-
preted this regulation as requiring that the amounts of employer
contributions be controlled by application of a predetermined
formula to factors whose values are independent of the discretion
of the employer.5 4 And in Lincoln Electric Co. Employees' Profit
Sharing Trust,55 the Tax Court that a profit-sharing trust created
by a single contribution of corpus in an amount determined by the
discretion of the employer, and which was to be distributed within
a ten year period, did not satisfy the regulation. Consistent with
this, contributions in excess of those required by a profit-sharing
formula have been held not deductible because they were not in
pursuance of the plan," and because they were not ordinary
and necessary business expenses. 57
On appeal, however, the Tax Court decision in the Lincoln
Electric case was reversed.5 8 The court of appeals concluded that
the single contribution itself served as the "definite predetermined
formula for determining the profits to be shared" upon which the
regulation requires a profit-sharing plan to be based. Moreover, the
51. Mim. 6136, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 58; P. S. 52, supra note 50.
52. Mim. 6136, supra note 51 (termination after reduction of excess
profits taxes or immediately after amending to comply with Treasury De-
partment insistence on elimination of discrimination in favor of executive
employees-not acceptable).
53. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1 (1944).
54. Though contributions must be determined by application of a
definite formula, its application may be restricted to profits exceeding a cer-
tain level, I. T. 3661, 1944 Cum. Bull. 315, and variable factors such as a
graduated scale of rates may be used, provided their value does not depend
on discretion. P. S. 33, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. ff 9531 (1944).
Profits subject to profit-sharing may be defined as net profits less such re-
serves as those for federal income taxes, dividends on 6% preferred stock,
or current liabilities, but may not be adjusted for a reserve whose level de-
pends on discretion, such as for dividends to be voted on a class of stock.
P. S. 21, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. fI 9519 (1944) ; accord, P. S.
16, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. ff 9514 (1944).
55. 14 T. C. 598 (1950).
56. Wooster Rubber Co., 14 T. C. 1192 (1950), rcv'd on other grounds,
189 F. 2d 878 (6th Cir. 1951).
57. Gross-Given Mfg. Co. v. Kelm, 99 F. Supp. 144 (D. Minn. 1951).
58. Lincoln Electric Co. Employees' Trust v. CIR, 190 F. 2d 326 (6th
Cir. 1951).
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court observed that if the requirements incorporated in the regula-
tion were not satisfied by the trust under consideration, the regu-
lation was invalid as an unjustified interpolation of the statute.""
The apparent significance of the Lincoln Electric decision lies in
the fact that, within the limitation that payments must not exceed
compensation for the employees benefited,"" it permits the size
and timing of the employer's contributions to depend on his dis-
cretion, rather than upon independent extrinsic conditions.6' This
in turn, makes possible the realization of tax advantages through
large deductible contributions only in years when high profits would
otherwise be subject to high corporate taxes. An acceptable profit-
sharing formula could be devised so that its application would
achieve substantially the same tax advantages. 6 2 This would,
however, require an advance determination of the level of profits
to be preserved for the stockholders. Also, should the employer be
presented with the possibility of another deductible expenditure not
allowed for in the definition of profits subject to the profit-sharing
formula, he could not choose it in lieu of the profit-sharing contri-
bution because of his commitments under the plan. If contributions
to profit-sharing plans are to be left entirely to the discretion
of the employer, termination or reduction of contributions for any
reason will logically no longer affect the status of the program as
a bona fide plan." It would seem that this liberalization of treat-
ment of profit-sharing plans would tend to an increase in their use
in place of pension plans, since substantially the same benefits
can be assured for both employer and employee, and the employer
59. See id. at 330.
60. See note 86 infra and text thereto.
61. The court of appeals used language that could be construed as
indicating that this liberality will be accorded only if the payment is to be the
initial and sole contribution to finance the plan over a period of years, see
Lincoln Electric Co. Employees' Trust v. CIR, 190 F. 2d 326, 329 (6th Cir.
1951), in which case the effect of the decision will be to permit the employer
to readjust the amount of his contributions only at the beginning of each
period. However, on the strength of the Lincohl Electric case, deductions
have been permitted for repeated discretionary contributions to the Fame plan,
though the Tax Court also did not choose to expressly over-rule the regula-
tion. Produce Reporter Co., IS T. C. No. 8 (Apr. 10, 1952). Similarly, while
holding the reduction in percentage of profits to be contributed was justified
by "business necessity," the Tax Court commented that Congress had not
provided that a profit-sharing plan must be permanent or include a con-
tributions formula, and that reasonable changes in such a formula were not
inconsistent with any intent of Congress. See E. R. Wagner Alfg. Co., 18
T. C. No. 76 (June 25, 1952).
62. See note 54 supra.
63. Ibid.
64. See notes 41-52 supra and text thereto.
1953] NOTE
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could avoid the restricting requirements of a "bona fide" plan. 5
This result would conflict with the policy of seeking to encourage
provision for the future security of employees, 6 since profit-sharing
plans do not provide a guaranteed level of future benefits.
Nevertheless, tax advantages are the inducement Congress has
offered in an effort to encourage adoption of profit-sharing plans. 7
Therefore, attacking the exempt status of such a plan on the ground
that it is being used for tax avoidance by means of taking ad-
vantage of the offered deductions seems illogical. While Congress
has provided that an exempt benefit plan must be for the exclusive
benefit of the employees or their beneficiaries,"' the whole tenor
of the provision, as evidenced by the fact that it is devoted almost
completely to preventing discriminatory distribution of funds, indi-
cates that this requirement must refer to benefits in the form of
payments from the plan. 9 If the tax advantages realized by the
employer constitute "benefits" within the terms of this restriction,
obviously no plan qualifies for the exemption. A maximization of
these tax advantages should not affect their nature as benefits to
the employer. Consistent with this reasoning, Congress has made no
provision respecting the permanence of a profit-sharing plan or
the adherence to a contributions formula. 0 Though there is value in
encouraging the use of permanent benefit programs, the Treasury
Department requirements of permanency seem inconsistent with
the intent of Congress.
LIMITATIONS ON THE NATURE AND AMIOUNTS OF DEDUCTIONS
Deductions from gross income are permitted for employer con-
tributions to employee-benefit plans by virtue of Internal Revenue
Section 23(p).71 But unless the plan conforms to the requirements
of Section 165(a) already discussed, the deductions will be per-
65. Ibid.
66. See Freyburger, Pe.nsion Plans-the Philosophy of Section 165(a),
22 Taxes 60 (1944).
67. See E. R. Wagner Mfg. Co., 18 T. C. No. 76 (June 25, 1952).
68. Int. Rev. Code § 165 (a).
69. The major ill for which a remedy was sought in the adoption of
the more stringent requirements of the 1942 Revenue Act appears to have
been the practice of distorting benefit plan payments in favor of stockholders
and executive level employees. See discussion of legislative history of § 162 of
the 1942 Revenue Act in 4 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation
§ 2571 (Supp. 1952).
70. See E. R. Wagner Mfg. Co., 18 T. C. No. 76 (June 25, 1952).
71. This has become the exclusive section permitting such deductions
which formerly were allowed also under section 23(a), relating to ordinary
and necessary expenses. See Tavannes Watch Co. v. CIR, 176 F. 2d 211, 214
(2d Cir. 1949).
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mitted only if the employees acquire immediate non-forfeitable in-
terests,7 2 and in such case the employees will be immediately taxed
on the contributions ;7:3 thus, the valuable privilege of delayed taxa-
tion depends on conformance with Section 165(a). As a result,
employer contributions must be made to a trust whose terms affirma-
tively make impossible any use of the funds other than for the
exclusive benefit of the employees.7 4 In the case of an annuity plan,
this requirement is satisfied by a provision that any premium
refunds 75 be redistributed to the employees in a manner not incon-
sistent with Section 165(a) .7
Deductible contributions to pension plans may be as large as
necessary to finance the benefits provided by the plan by means of
uniform contributions over the period of employment remaining
before the retirement of each included employee.7 7 Either of two
alternative limitations are applicable if a more liberal maximum
will result from their use. The employer may contribute annually an
amount equal to five per cent of the compensation otherwise paid or
accrued to the employees covered7 8 or an amount equal to the normal
costT of the plan for the year plus ten per cent of the cost, as of the
date they were included under the plan, of any past service or sup-
plementary credits.80 Should contributions in any year exceed the
72. Int. Rev. Code § 23(p).
73. Int. Rev. Code § 22(b) (2) (B).
74. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-2 (1943) (however, upon termina-
tion the employer may recover any surplus resulting from erroneous actuarial
calculations); Mim 6394, 1949-1 Cum Bull. 118. Conditional payments are
deductible if recoverable by the employer only on the contingency of dis-
approval of the plan under wage stabilization requirements. P. S. 68, P-H
Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. T 9567 (1951).
75. "Premium refunds" means "payments by the insurer on account of
credits such as dividends, experience rating credits, or surrender or can-
cellation credits." U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(p)-9(c) (1948).
76. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.(p)-9 (1948) ; P. S. 45, P-H Pension
& Profit-Sharing Serv. 9543 (1945).
77. Int. Rev. Code § 23(p) (1) (A) (ii). There is one exception, however.
Should the unfunded cost of the plan for any three employees exceed 50% of
the total unfunded cost, deductions for the cost of their benefits must be
spread over at least a five year period. Ibid.
78. Int. Code § 23(p) (1) (A) (i). This percentage may be reduced if
periodic examinations of the plan by the Commissioner reveal that it is
higher than reasonably required to provide the benefits. Ibid.
79. See definition in note 35 supra.
80. Int. Rev. Code § 23(p) (1) (A) (iii). See definition of past service
or supplementary costs in note 45 supra. Contrary to the position taken by
the Treasury Department, P. S. 36, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv.
1 9534 (1944), it has been held that the requirement of this Code section that
past service credits be funded over a period of at least ten years does not
prevent more rapid funding under Int. Rev. Code § 23(p) (1) (A) (ii), if
wecessary to finance the benefits offered. Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co. v.




amount deductible for that period, the excess may be deducted in
succeeding years in order of time to the extent that contributions
in those years are less than the maximum permissible deductions.s
Annual deductions equal to fifteen per cent of the compensation
otherwise paid the employees covered may be taken for contribution
to profit-sharing plans.82 Not only may contributions in excess of
this limit be deducted in succeeding years, but if contributions in
any year are less than the permissible maximum, the difference may
be carried forward to increase the maximums available for succeed-
ing years; but in no event may the deduction for any year exceed
thirty per cent of the compensation otherwise paid the covered
employees during that year. 3 Irrespective of the statutory maxi-
mums, contributions in excess of the amount required by the profit-
sharing formula are not deductible in either the current14 or
succeeding years.85 Contributions to any benefit plan, when added
to all other compensation paid the employee for whose benefit they
are made, must not exceed the level of reasonable compensation for
the services rendered.8 6
81. Int. Rev. Code § 23(p) (1) (A) (iv) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §
29.23(p)-8 (1948).
82. Int. Rev. Code § 23(p)(1)(C). A program will be considered a
pension rather than a profit-sharing plan if either the benefits to be provided
or the employer contributions required can be determined actuarially rather
than by the level of profits of the employer. I. T. 3660, 1944 Cum. Bull. 136;
P. S. 24, P-H Pension & Profit-Sharing Serv. fI 9521 (1944).
83. Int. Rev. Code § 23(p) (1) (C) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (p)-10
(1948).
84. Gross-Given Mfg. Co. v. Kelm, 99 F. Supp. 144 (D. Minn. 1951)
Wooster Rubber Co., 14 T. C. 1192 (1950), rez'd on other grounds, 189 F. 2d
878 (6th Cir. 1951). The relaxation of the requirement that a profit-sharing plan
include a contributions formula has perhaps lessened the significance of these
cases. See notes 58-61 supra and text thereto.
85. I. T. 4055, 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 30.
86. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(p)-1 (1948) , see Acme Pie Co.,
P-H 1951 TC Mem. Dec. ff 51,029 (1051) ; Charles E. Smith & Sons Co.,
P-H 1947 TC Mem. Dec. ff 47,128 (1947), aff'd, 184 F. 2d 1011 (6th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 953 (1951).
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